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II. STATEIVIENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment granting in part Mr. Alexander Jason 
Woodley's petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
Mr. Woodley pled guilty to felony driving under the influence pursuant to a binding plea 
agreement, which provided that the district court withhold judgment and that Mr. Woodley not 
serve additional jail time. R. (38348) 60-67. 1 The agreement gave Mr. Woodley the right to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the event the district court rejected the sentencing recommendations 
set forth in the agreement. Id. at 61. Although the district cou1i indicated that it was accepting 
the plea agreement, it nonetheless suspended a unified term of seven years and placed Mr. 
Woodley on probation for five years instead of granting a withheld judgment. See id. at 69-70, 
303. Mr. Woodley, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal ("the first appeal") and 
motion to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"). Id. at 81-86. The Supreme 
Court conditionally dismissed the appeal "unless the required fees for preparation of the Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript [were] paid to the District Court within" twenty-one days. Id. 
at 87. Counsel failed to pay the record and transcript fees or to support Mr. Woodley's motion to 
appoint the SAPD with a financial affidavit. See Tr. (38195) p. 51, In. 3 - 54, In. 15 (state's 
recitation of procedural history relating to dismissal of appeal). Tbe Supreme Court therefore 
1Contemporaneous with this brief, Mr. Woodely has filed a request that the Court take 
judicial notice of the record and transcripts in an appeal in the criminal case, Stare v. Alexander 
Jason Woodley, Dock. No. 38348. Citations herein will refer to the respective docket numbers. 
dismissed the appeal on October 22, 2007 and issued a rcmittitur on November 14, 2007. R. 
(3 8348) 102, 120. 
On January 31, 2008, the district court revoked Mr. Woodley' s probation and retained 
jurisdiction for 180 days. R. (38348) 132-33. On April 11, 2008, Mr. Woodley, acting prose, 
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a motion to refile the first appeal or to file that 
appeal late ("pro se motions"). Id. at 151-156. [n these motions, Mr. Woodley noted the district 
court failed to follow the plea agreement and asserted that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Id. On September 4, 2008, the district comt relinquished jurisdiction and imposed Mr. 
Woodley's original sentence. Id. at 323-327. Mr. Woodley appealed the district court's decision 
to revoke probation and impose his sentence and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an 
unpublished opinion. See id. at 352-54. The district court also denied Mr. Woodley's prose 
motions, noting in part that it lacked jurisdiction to consider either motion. Id. at 301-315. No 
appeal was filed from the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw Mr. Woodley's guilty 
plea. 
2. Post-conviction proceedings 
On March 25, 2009, Mr. Woodley filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's error in not withholding 
judgment, failing to support the motion to appoint the SAPD in the first appeal with evidence of 
indigence and failing to file a post-conviction petition or to amend his prose motions to a post-
conviction petition. R. (38195) 7-10. Mr. Woodley filed a motion for equitable tolling arguing 
that the statute of limitations should be tolled because mental illness and medication prevented 
him from timely pursuing post-conviction relief Id. at 36-37, 63-64. Mr. Woodley also argued 
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that his prose motions should be construed as initiating post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 65. 
The district comi denied ~1r. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling, finding that 
regardless of Mr. Woodley's "mental state during the period of time he had to file a timely 
petition for post-conviction relief as to [the] original judgment, [he] was represented by able 
counsel who were charged with representing [his] legal interests." Id. at 110. Mr. Woodley 
responded that the district court's refusal to toll the statute of limitations based on Mr. Woodley's 
status as being represented established that Mr. Woodley's counsel was ineffective for not timely 
filing a post-conviction relief petition or asking the district court to construe his prose motions 
as initiating a post-conviction action. Id. at 132-36. 
In an amended petition, Mr. Woodley asserted that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because counsel did not notify the district court that it failed to follow the binding plea 
agreement and permitted the first appeal to be dismissed. Id. at 184-86. Mr. Woodley also 
contended that the attorney appointed to represent him after the first appeal was dismissed was 
ineffective for failing to timely initiate a post-conviction action. Id. at 186-87. Finally, Mr. 
Woodley alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of Mr. Woodley's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 187. The state moved for summary dismissal of Mr. 
Woodley' s petition as untimely but conceded that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to appeal the denial of Mr. Woodley's motion to withdraw his plea was timely. R. 
(38195) 193-94, 200; Tr. (38195) p. 91, In. -18. 
The district court concluded that "without question" it erred in sentencing '\Irr. Woodley 
"and suspending that sentence, rather than entering a withheld judgment and placing [Mr.] 
Woodley on probation, without allowing [Mr.] Woodley to withdraw his plea." R. (38195) 207. 
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The district court also found that counsel's failure to either ensure the SAPD's appointment or 
pay the required transcript and record fees caused the appeal's dismissal. Id. The district 
court nevertheless dismissed Mr. Woodley's claims regarding counsel's failure to object to the 
plea agreement's breach and his failure to prevent the first appeal from being dismissed as 
untimely. Id. at 208. 
The district court granted Mr. Woodley an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at 209. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Mr. Woodley was entitled to 
appeal the order denying his motion to withdraw his plea and re-issued that order allowing Mr. 
Woodley to file a timely appeal. Id. at 229-250. Mr. Woodley's appeal from the reissued order 
is pending in Docket No. 38348. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in declining to equitably toll the statute of limitations on Mr. 
Woodley's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's error in 
sentencing and allowing the first appeal to be dismissed? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Schultz 
v. State, 151 Idaho 383,385,256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 2011); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 
295, 92 P.3d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a post-conviction action, either 
upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised 
no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him to the 
requested relief. Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650,651,239 P.3d 448,449 (Ct. App. 2010); 
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Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P. 3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue 
is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 651, 239 P.3d at 
449; c)parks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545. On appeal from the summary dismissal of a 
petition for post-conviction relief, this Court inquires whether the petition, affidavits, or other 
evidence supporting the petition allege facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. 
Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353,355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). 
A petition for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the determination of 
a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. LC. § 19-4902(a). The statute of limitation 
may be equitably tolled to protect a petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful 
opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 P .3d at 793-94; Leer v. 
State, 148 Idaho 112,115,218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009). This Comi freely reviews the 
district court's construction and application of the limitation statute. Person v. State, 147 Idaho 
453,454, 210 P.3d 561, 562 (Ct. App. 2009); Freeman v. State, 1 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 
l 088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Here, the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Woodley's claims as untimely without 
addressing Mr. Woodley' s claim that the limitation period should be tolled as a result of mental 
illness and psychotropic medication. Mr. Woodley was harmed by this error because he presented 
an issue of fact as to whether his mental state prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction 
petition. The district court further erred in refusing to recognize that counsel's ineftective 
assistance, in combination with the misleading statements made by the state, could toll the statute 
oflimitations. Moreover, the district court should have construed Mr. Woodley's prose motions 
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as initiating a post-conviction action. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's 
dismissal of his claims as untimely and remand the case for further proceedings. 
A. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as Untimely Because 
He Presented an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Mental State Prevented Him from 
Timely Filing a Post-Conviction Petition 
A mental disease and/or psychotropic medication, which renders a petitioner incompetent 
and prevents him or her from timely pursuing challenges to his conviction, equitably tolls the 
statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957,960, 88 
P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003). To toll the statute of limitations on account of mental illness or 
medication, a petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered 
him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or otherwise 
rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 
141 Idaho 579,582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Rather than analyze whether Mr. Woodley's mental illness or psychotropic medication 
prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction petition, the district court found that Mr. 
Woodley "was represented by able counsel who were charged with representing [his] legal 
interests" during the relevant time frame. 2 R. (38195) 110. However, counsel was appointed to 
represent Mr. Woodley in the criminal action. R. (38348) 111, 226. In order to secure 
2In its order denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling, the district court 
incorrectly indicated that Mr. Woodley had I 00 days from the date his appeal was dismissed on 
October 27, 2007 to file a petition for post-conviction relief. R. (38 I 95) I 09. The district court 
recognized its mistake and later indicated that Mr. Woodley had one year from October 27, 2007 
to seek post-conviction relief. Tr. (38195) p. 46, ln. 6-9, ln.17-19. The statute of limitations 
actually expired one year after the issuance of the remittitur on November 21, 2007. See Leer, 
148 Idaho at 114, 218 P .3d at 1175 (noting the petitioner had one year from date remittitur was 
issued in criminal appeal to file his petition for post-conviction relief). 
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appointment of counsel in a post-conviction case, the petitioner - prose - must first file a petition 
that alleges facts raising the possibility of a valid claim. See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004). That counsel was appointed to assist Mr. Woodley in the 
criminal action did not foreclose the possibility that mental illness and the effects of medication 
prevented Mr. Woodley from filing a post-conviction petition prose. 
Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling 
on the basis that counsel was appointed to represent him in the underlying criminal proceedings 
during the relevant time period. The district court should have instead addressed Mr. Woodley's 
claim that his mental illness and medications prevented him from timely filing the post-conviction 
action. 
Moreover, Mr. Woodley presented an issue of fact as to whether mental illness and 
psychotropic medication prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction action. The remittitur 
from Mr. Woodley's direct appeal was filed November 21, 2007 and he was required to file his 
petition for post-conviction relief before November 21, 2008.3 On November 9, 2007, Mr. 
Woodley was admitted to the Eastern Idaho Regional Behavioral Health Center as a result of 
suicidal ideation and self-mutilation. R. (38195) 36; State's Exhibit A (38348). Upon his release, 
he was prescribed psychotropic medicine. R. (38195) 36. On January 29, 2008, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Woodley to a period ofretained jurisdiction and the Idaho Department of 
3Mr. Woodley had one year from the date the Supreme Court issued the remittitur in his 
first appeal notwithstanding the fact that the appeal was dismissed. An appeal, which is 
dismissed as untimely, does not toll the post-conviction statute oflimitations. Amboh, 149 Idaho 
at 652, 39 P.3d at 450. In a situation involving an untimely appeal, the appellate court has no 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal and permitting an untimely appeal to restart the limitation period 
would render it meaningless. Id. Conversely, Mr. Woodley's first appeal was timely filed and 
this Court possessed jurisdiction to determine the appeal on its merits. 
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Con-ection assigned him to the mental health unit where he continued to take psychotropic 
medication. See R. (38195) 68. On April 23, 2008, Mr. Woodley suffered a breakdown and was 
hospitalized at the Idaho Maximum Security Institute. Id. at 3 6, 41, 4 3. On May 11, 2008, prison 
staff recommended a second rider because Mr. Woodely exhibited cognitive distortions and 
difficulty grasping and applying concepts. Id. at 41-4 3. 
The district cou11 erred in denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling on the basis 
that counsel was appointed to represent him in the underlying criminal proceedings during the 
relevant time period. Additionally, Mr. Woodely presented an issue of fact as to whether mental 
illness and psychotropic medication prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction action. 
This Comi should therefore reverse the district com1's order denying equitable tolling and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as 
Untimely Because Counsel Had an Obligation to Advise Him That the Issues Raised 
in His Pro Sc Motions Would Be Properly Raised in a Post-Conviction Petition and 
the State's Conduct Was Misleading 
Regardless of whether the district court erred in rejecting Mr. Woodley's equitable tolling 
claim because counsel was appointed in the criminal action, this Court should conclude that the 
district court erred in failing to recognize that counsel's neglect and the state's conduct deprived 
Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. 
Equitable tolling in post-conviction actions is borne of the petitioner's due process right to 
have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 
P.3d at 793-94; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d at 1176. ·'Tolling is not allowed for a 
petitioner's own inaction." Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794; see also Amboh, 149 Idaho 
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at 653, 239 P.3d at 451. In Amboh, the petitioner claimed that his defense attorney was deficient 
for failing to file a timely notice of appeal from his judgment of conviction. Ilowevcr, well within 
the statute of limitations to file a petition for post-conviction relief, counsel informed the 
petitioner that his appeal was untimely and informed him that he had "post-conviction rights." 
The Court concluded: 
Even though the defense attorney may have contributed confusion by pointlessly 
filing an untimely notice of appeal, if Amboh had exercised reasonable diligence 
he could have determined that the appeal was dismissed long before the limitation 
period for a post-conviction action expired. Instead, despite having been notified 
that his appeal was filed after the appeal deadline, Amboh waited for nearly one 
and a half years before he made any inquiry about the disposition of the appeal and 
thereby learned of its dismissal. Neither the State nor anyone else concealed from 
Amboh the fact that this appeal was untimely or that it had been dismissed. 
Amboh's failure to file a timely petition raising his claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel was not due to an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control, but by 
his own lack of diligence. In this circumstance, equitable tolling is not appropriate. 
Amboh, 149 Idaho at 653,239 P.3d at 451. Similarly, in Schultz, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that there was no deprivation of due process because the petitioner had a year and forty-two days 
within which to file his post-conviction petition but chose to wait over three years because he 
incorrectly believed the law allowed him to wait. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 387,256 P.3d at 795. 
In contrast, Mr. Woodley was quite diligent about pursuing his rights but utilized the 
incorrect vehicle to do so. Well within the statute of limitations, on April 11, 2008, Mr. Woodley 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea alleging that the plea agreement was breached and that his 
attorney was ineffective. R. (38348) 151-53. In his motion to re-file the first appeal or to file it 
late, Mr. Woodley outlined counsel's ineffective assistance in permitting the appeal to be 
dismissed. Id. at 154-55. Mr. Woodley drafted these motions pro sc although he was represented 
by counsel at the time in the criminal case. Id. at 111. Thus, Mr. Woodley timely and diligently 
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pursued his ineffective assistance of counsel claims but incorrectly titled his pleadings. 
Moreover, by assisting Mr. Woodley with his pro se motions, counsel reinforced Mr. 
Woodley's mistaken belief that he was correctly pursuing his relief. The law clearly provided that 
the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the pro se motions and that ineffective 
assistance of counsel was appropriately sought in post-conviction proceedings. State v. Jakoski, 
139 Idaho 352,355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (the trial court's jurisdiction to hear motion to 
withdraw plea expires once the judgment becomes final); State v. A;fitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 
76, 859 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Ct. App. 1993), (ineffective assistance of counsel claims appropriately 
presented through post-conviction relief proceedings). Given these circumstances, counsel should 
have advised Mr. Woodley of his post-conviction reliefrights and counsel's failure to do so 
deprived Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. 
Aggravating the situation, in its objection to Mr. Woodley's motion to withdraw his plea, 
the state argued: 
The claims raised by [Mr. Woodley] should have been filed within a petition for 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 49, Idaho Code. Petitioner is 
now beyond the statute of limitations for bringing such claims and is attempting to 
use Idaho Criminal Rule 33 to avoid such claims being barred by the statue of 
limitations applicable to post-conviction matters. 
R. (38348) 23 L 
This argument was misleading because Mr. Woodley filed his motion to withdraw his plea 
well within the post-conviction statute of limitations and thus could not have filed that motion 
simply to avoid the statute of limitations. Rather, it appears Mr. Woodley was simply mistaken 
about the co1Tect manner in which to pursue his desired relief. Moreover, at the time the state's 
brief was filed on August 8, 2008, the statute of limitations still would not expire for another three 
10 
months. Thus, while the state's brief informed Mr. Woodley that his relief would be more 
appropriately sought in a post-conviction action, it misled him into believing that he had already 
lost the opportunity to do so. See also Tr. (38195) p. 98, ln. 1 14; R. 142. 
Mr. Woodley diligently attempted to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
within the statute of limitations but incorrectly did so by filing his pro se motions instead of a 
document titled petition for post-conviction relief. Because counsel actively assisted Mr. 
Woodley in pursuing his claims through the incorrect vehicle, counsel had an obligation to advise 
Mr. Woodley of his post-conviction rights. Further, the state misled Mr. Woodley by 
misinforming him regarding the true statute of limitations. These circumstances deprived Mr. 
Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his post-conviction claims despite his diligent 
attempts to do so. The district court therefore erred in refusing to apply equitable tolling and the 
case should be remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed claims. 
C. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as 
Untimely Because the Pro Se Motions Tolled the Time to File a Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief 
As discussed above, Mr. Woodley alleged that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in his pro sc motion to withdraw his plea and his motion to re-file the first appeal. R. 
(38348) 151-55. Courts are obliged to liberally construe prose pleadings and to afford the inmate 
litigant the benefit of any doubt Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 
In light of the liberal construction given to the pleadings of pro se inmates, the unfortunate 
mislabelling of a motion is not necessarily fatal to maintaining the inmate's claims. United States 
v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 94 l, 943 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to protect Mr. Woodley's due process 
right to a meaningful opportunity to present his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the 
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district court should have construed Mr. Woodley's mis-titled motion as a petition for post-
conviction relief or concluded that filing those motions tolled the time to file a post-conviction 
petition. 
Mr. Woodley recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court declined to construe a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea as a petition for post-conviction relief in Jakoski. Nevertheless, an 
appellate decision should be overruled if it is manifestly wrong or overruling is necessary to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice. State v. Watts, 142 
Idaho 230,232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). The Jakoski Court recognized that "substance, not 
form should govern" when a litigant mislabels a pleading. Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 
714. The Court nevertheless held that "it would be too much of a stretch to hold that a motion 
filed in a criminal case can be considered as a pleading commencing civil litigation." Id. This 
holding is fundamentally unfair and causes the deprivation of a meaningful opportunity for post-
conviction litigants to present their claims. Jakoski should therefore be overruled. 
A pro se inmate - not only untrained in the law but also often lacking in education and 
resources - does not understand the distinction between a motion filed in a case to attack a 
conviction and a petition initiating a collateral proceeding to attack that conviction. Thus, 
pleadings titled "petition for post-conviction relief' frequently list the criminal case number in the 
caption. Indeed, Mr. Woodley's post-conviction petition erroneously listed the criminal case 
number in the caption and the district court simply crossed it out and assigned a new civil case 
number. R. (38195) 7. There is no reason that the district court could not similarly strike the 
criminal case number in a pleading titled as a motion filed in the criminal case but clearly seeking 
relief appropriate in a post-conviction action. 
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The distinction relied on by the Jakoski Court a motion in the criminal action and a 
petition initiating a new action is arbitrary, meaningless to a prose inmate and advocates fonn 
over substance. Prose inmate pleadings should be liberally construed and treated as initiating the 
action appropriate for the relief that is sought notwithstanding any unfortunate mislabeling of the 
pleadings. See Johnson, 988 F.2d at 943. The rule in Jakoski is therefore fundamentally unfair 
and deprives prose inmates of a meaningful opportunity to present their post-conviction claims. 
Mr. Woodley timely raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in pleadings that 
were mislabeled as "motions" instead of as a "petition" for post-conviction relief. These motions 
should be liberally construed as initiating a post-conviction action or as tolling the time to initiate 
such an action. The failure to do so would deprive Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to 
present his claims and would therefore violate the procedural due process guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Woodley respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his claims as untimely and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this_.__ day of September, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of September, 201 I, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, 
Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
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